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THE DEBT CRISIS 
Art Comstock 
Introduction 
In Aprill982, Argentina declared default on 
the servicing of its foreign-denominated -debts. 
This event has been called "one of the most trau-
matic episodes in the history of world financial 
crises on account of its intensity and length." 
(Montanaro, p. 73) Its effects on Argentina and 
the rest of the world still linger today. 
The Argentine debt continues to limit the 
nation 's quest for development. Rather than 
investing in its future, Argentina continually 
pays for its past spending. Until recently, eco-
nomic progress has been slowed while scarce 
resources are sent abroad to pay the debt. In 
order for Argentina to develop further, a solution 
must be reached; but the country cannot do it 
alone. The United States must make every effort 
to help alleviate the crisis and create a mutually 
acceptable solution. Mter all, the United States 
has not only a financial interest, but also a polit-
ical and a future investment interest in the res-
olution of the Argentine debt crisis. 
In order to develop a solution, it is crucial 
to understand the nature of the crisis and the 
changes in the Argentine political structure 
that have occurred up to the present. In this 
article, I review the origins of the debt crisis 
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which largely reflect the ineffective past politi-
cal and economic policies of the government. 
I then analyze the effects of the crisis on the 
Argentine economy and the current attempts 
to rebuild and restructure. Finally, I examine 
proposed solutions to the crisis and the poten-
tial effectiveness of each. 
Origins of the Argentine Debt Crisis 
A financial crisis can be defined as a momen-
tary lack of liquidity. It is usually caused by the 
inability of financial institutions to make debt pay-
ments. Then, a "snowballing" effect occurs as 
investors panic, removing their funds from the 
system. A dangerous financial collapse ensues. 
However, countries in the intermediate 
stage of their industrialization process (like 
Argentina) often have very different underly-
ing reasons for a financial crisis. In such 
instances, the main contributing factor can 
often be classified as a structural insolvency of 
the foreign sector. The situation evolves from 
a sustained growth in foreign debt due to cer-
tain characteristics in the economic system. 
These countries generally have a primary and 
an industrial sector which are distinct from 
one another. The primary sector is highly pro-
ductive and efficient, but the industrial sector 
is immature and undeveloped. 
For instance, in the Argentine case the pri-
mary sector- farming- has been successful 
due to the fertile land of the pampas. But, the 
industrial sector's relative productivity lagged 
behind to such an extent that it could not com-
pete internationally with industries of more 
developed countries. This inefficiency created 
problems due to the exchange rate. In order to 
be competitive, the Argentine exchange rate 
was set at a level which allowed what was pro-
duced in the agricultural sector to be exported 
competitively. Thus, the exchange rate was set 
on the basis of the competitiveness of the pri-
mary sector, without recognizing the ineffi-
ciency of the industrial sector. In other words, 
Argentina created a pampan dollar that could 
not be sustained by the underdeveloped indus-
trial sector. (Wionczek, p. 236) 
As Argentine industry began to grow, how-
ever, it required more and more foreign 
exchange for importing raw materials and cap-
ital goods. But, because of the protective tar-
iffs established to make industrial products 
more competitive on the international market, 
the industrial sector did not export. All gener-
ation of foreign exchange was then left to the 
primary sector, which was growing much more 
slowly than the industrial sector. Eventually, 
the primary sector could no longer supply the 
foreign currency needed by the industrial sec-
tor, and the foreign exchange reserves were 
exhausted. In order to continue its economic 
activity and pay its foreign debt, the govern-
ment thus resorted to attracting foreign capi-
tal and credit. Of course, these funds only cre-
ated more debt payments that went unpaid as 
the cycle continued. And as the crisis in the 
balance of payments progressed, more foreign 
indebtedness was incurred to finance expendi-
ture in foreign currency. The end result was a 
growing accumulation of foreign debt and peri-
odic crises in the balance of payments. 
This structural insolvency of the Argentine 
system may have been the underlying cause of 
its foreign indebtedness, but ineffective politi-
cal and economic policies further increased the 
structural difficulties. In fact, the financial his-
tory of Argentina beginning in the 1940s can be 
termed as one of "backward development." 
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(Montanaro, p. 73) The Argentine financial sys-
tem began with a policy of "financial repres-
sion" which forces a transfer of savings towards 
the protected sectors of the manufacturing 
industry, thus promoting an import-substitut-
ing industrialization. The newly established 
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 
(BCRA) implemented such a structure, which 
brought about a period of temporary econom-
ic growth. The BCRA took upon itself all 
responsibility for the government's decisions in 
the financial sector, in the cost of credit, and it:J. 
the reward for saving. It imposed high reserve 
requirements and interest rate restrictions on 
loans. Taken together, these factors created a 
system that rewarded productive investments 
and punished the accumulation of liquid assets. 
(Montanaro, pp. 73-74) 
Over a period of about thirty years, this 
model managed to sustain a stable and efficient 
financial structure. Its success was mainly a 
result of this government encouragement of 
savings through investment in the economy. 
Such a trend in savings is often a necessary 
ingredient for the economic growth of an 
underdeveloped financial structure into a devel-
oped financial structure. However, these polit-
ical decisions throughout this period limited 
the overall growth of the Argentine economy. 
Due to this financial repression policy of gen-
erating economic growth through import -sub-
stitution, the Argentine economy remained 
closed to foreign investment and dependent 
solely upon government institutions for pro-
ductivity and growth. The domestic industry 
was sheltered from competition, due to the pro-
tective tariffs mentioned earlier; and as a con-
sequence Argentina experienced low growth as 
compared to other developing countries. 
Furthermore, as a result of the structural insol-
vency of the foreign sector as mentioned earli-
er, the balance of payments crisis worsened; and 
the government unwisely chose to increase the 
money supply in order to service the interest 
payments on the foreign debt. As a result, infla-
tion began to rise steadily in the middle 1970s. 
In fact, in 1976 the annual rate of inflation was 
about 382 percent, compared with an average 
of only around 25 percent between 1960 and 
1974. (Montanaro, p. 76) 
The new government regime that took 
control in 1976 hoped to alleviate the inflation 
problem by freeing the economy and increas-
ing productivity in the government-owned 
industries. A plan of financial deregulation, 
along with the abolition of foreign trade laws 
which previously hampered international 
exports , was also implemented. The plan 's 
intention was to stimulate competition through 
a laissez-faire approach. Soon afterwards, the 
Banking Act of 1977 allowed banks to have 
direct control over interest rates on deposits , 
yet still called for a 100 percent guarantee by 
the government of domestic deposits. In other 
words, the act allowed the banks, investors, and 
market competition to determine the going 
rates. As these and other deregulatory measures 
continued, an increase in M2/GOP1 from .12 to 
.245 followed in the next year. (Montanaro, 
p. 77) This increase in the money supply rela-
tive to GOP growth showed the inability of the 
economy to grow at a rate equal to the increase 
in the monetary base, which was a result of the 
money expansion freedom suddenly given to 
banks. By allowing interest rates to float freely, 
the government opened the financial market 
for product innovations in investments such as 
time deposits and acceptance certificates of 
deposits; and so investors concentrated on these 
new short-term, profit-making opportunities. 
However, this shift towards other investment 
opportunities only furthered the decrease in 
long-term demand deposits that had been 
occurring over recent years. 
Another unsuccessful move by the finan-
cial system was the establishment of an active 
crawling peg exchange rate from the peso to the 
dollar. The crawling peg system bound mone-
tary authorities to future quotations of 
exchange rates for a certain period, with the 
hope of limiting the amount of devaluation. In 
essence, monetary authorities were forced to 
maintain the established rate of exchange for 
that period, even if market forces called for an 
adjustment, in order to slow the fall of the peso 
against the dollar. The main intent was to 
instill some confidence in the peso's stability 
and to reduce investors' dangerous inflationary 
expectations. But as a result of the arbitrage 
1M2/GOP is the rati o of the money supply, including 
bank deposits, to the gross domestic product. 
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opportunities between the official and the effec-
tive rate of exchange, the plan failed. Market 
investors recognized the discrepancy between 
the position held by the monetary authorities 
and the true position of the peso in the market, 
and they continued to profit from it. 
Furthermore , due to the discrepancy 
between the crawling peg exchange rate and the 
true rate, a banking "euphoria" erupted in the 
late 1970s. The Argentine financial system and 
the number of banks expanded rapidly. In fact, 
deposits grew by 86 percent and credit grew by 
110 percent over the three years preceding the 
crisis (1979 to 1981). Also, the spread between 
bank rates on loans and deposits increased sig-
nificantly. This difference showed the inexpe-
rience of a banking system which had never had 
the opportunity for correct risk evaluation due 
to thirty years of financial repression. 
Along these same lines, foreign speculation 
further accentuated the debt problem. Financing 
in pesos became the primary method by which 
to acquire financial assets to use as collateral for 
dollar debts. This speculation was caused both 
by the greater profitability available due to the 
high differential between interest rates in 
Argentina and those rates on the dollar, and by 
the overvaluation of the peso as stated above. For 
these reasons, between 1979 and 1981 the for-
eign currency debt obligation expanded from $19 
billion to $35.7 billion. And foreign debt overall 
showed an increase of $30 billion from 1976 to 
1982, while GOP shrank over the same period. 
On February 2, 1981, the peso was deval-
ued by ten percent in an attempt to eliminate 
the discrepancy between the official and the 
effective exchange rates and to discourage for-
eign speculation. Within a few months, finan-
cial authorities were again forced to devalue the 
peso, this time by thirty percent. However, it 
was all too late. A dramatic rise in U.S. dollar 
interest rates triggered a financial panic. Since 
most loans were granted at a variable interest 
rate , the reduction in the likelihood of 
Argentine debtors making the payments scared 
investors. Foreign short-term credit agree-
ments were not renewed, and the flight of pri-
vate capital rose sharply. Foreign investors 
became fearful of an Argentine default and thus 
began to withdraw their capital. As a conse-
quence, a spread of insolvency occurred, which 
progressed from firms, to the banking system, 
to the government, and to the central bank. 
Finally, in 1982 Argentina was forced to 
default on its foreign currency debts. Another 
round of panic soon spread, followed by even 
more massive flights of capital. Virtually all 
international lending to Argentina likewise 
ceased, and the bulk of private foreign debt was 
then assumed by the government. As the pub-
lic sector undertook the debt denominated in 
foreign currencies of the private sector, a still 
larger budget deficit had to be financed domes-
tically, which again stimulated inflation as the 
public sector attempted to raise money through 
its own domestic means. 
The Crisis and Its Effects 
Upon declaration of default, investors 
quickly pulled out of Argentina. All faith in the 
Argentine economy was lost. Short-term loans 
became the only form of investment, as restric-
tions were imposed upon Argentina by the inter-
national capital markets. By the end of 1983, 
Argentina's total foreign debt amounted to $45 
billion, more than double the level of the late 
1970s. Any further investing would need the 
financial support of the IMF and the World Bank. 
In addition to the continuously increasing 
interest payments, inflation deepened the prob-
lem. In fact, the annual Argentine inflation rate 
reached over 200 percent by 1982. (Bowne, 
p. 9) This increase had mainly been a result of 
the lack of control exercised by the BCRA and 
the government over fiscal policy and the money 
supply. The government and its agents lacked 
the self-discipline necessary to achieve stability. 
Evasion from government taxes was common as 
the tax collection system was not strictly 
enforced, and the federal government lacked the 
authority to do so. Furthermore, the many 
state-owned enterprises were provided with 
large subsidies due to their inability to meet 
market needs. Because of these large subsidies 
and the tax evasion problem, even larger pub-
lic-sector deficits resulted. These deficits were 
again financed in large part through increases 
in the money supply and external financing 
attempts. And as inflation continued to soar, 
real economic growth turned negative for 1982. 
Although strong efforts were made to 
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reduce government expenditures and increase 
revenues through higher taxes, the effects were 
limited. The reasons were again the inefficien-
cy of the tax system as well as a budgetary 
process based on bilateral negotiations with spe-
cial interest groups. Due to the political sup-
port of these influential groups, many federal 
expenditures that could have been eliminated 
were still kept. Even though government expen-
ditures in real terms were cut by 10.5 percent 
and tax revenues were increased by 10.7 percent 
between 1983 and 1985, the above restrictions 
hampered further reductions in expenditures 
and increases in revenues. (Bowne, p. 9) 
With the public sector debt still out of con-
trol and inflation still accelerating, the 
Argentine government in 1985 initiated a plan 
to stabilize the economy. This new effort, called 
the Austral Plan after the hoped-for restoration 
of the value of the new currency, was based on 
a strict wage and price freeze, a fixed exchange 
rate , positive real interest rates, and fiscal 
adjustment. The government fixed the exchange 
rate of the austral to the U.S. dollar with the 
intention of adding stability and investor confi-
dence to the currency. In 1986 the Austral Plan 
managed to reduce inflation to an annual rate 
of 90.1 percent (the lowest level in 12 years) , 
while real GDP grew by 7.3 percent over the 
1985 level. However, because the government 
could still not maintain control over the bud-
get deficit, the improvements turned out to be 
short-lived. Public revenues declined as export 
taxes were greatly shrunk to offset low interna-
tional prices for Argentine agricultural prod-
ucts. Also, the BCRA continued to expand cred-
it to the public sector through rediscounts. 
Credit increased through the use of these 
instruments by re-valuing the debt already owed 
and accepting a value less than the actual face 
value so that creditors were given even more 
borrowing opportunity. Thus, short-term debt 
increased, and the BCRA deficit climbed. 
As the rate of inflation remained high and 
even began to rise again, still more stabilization 
attempts were made. In August 1988, the 
Primavera Plan was adopted. Similar to past 
attempts, this plan relied upon a wage and price 
freeze to slow inflation, a gains tax on grain 
sales, and an increase in interest rates. Its sta-
bilization effor-ts were nearly identical to those 
of earlier plans, and so its results were likewise 
short-lived. Inflation quickly dropped from 27.6 
percent per month to 5. 7 percent per month. 
(Bowne, p. 9) The fiscal situation improved 
slightly, and real interest rates turned higher. 
As a consequence, inflows of short-term exter-
nal capital began to rise once more. But once 
again, the public sector failed to improve. As 
more and more citizens evaded their federal tax 
requirements and as prices of public goods 
remained relatively high, private investors ' 
overall lack of confidence in the system height-
ened. This lack of confidence was manifested 
by a decrease in consumption and investment 
in the second part of 1988 and a drop in GOP of 
1.9 percent for the year. (Bowne, p. 9) 
Furthermore, the Primavera Plan faced 
sudden failure when yet another crisis in the 
foreign exchange and financial markets 
occurred in early 1989. Due to the high prices 
of public sector goods relative to the prices of 
similar private goods as noted above, a severe 
price imbalance between the two markets 
resulted. That imbalance, along with the 
impending national elections, led to expecta-
tions of a huge devaluation. Thus, flight from 
the austral increased, and the gap between the 
free and official exchange rates reached an aver-
age of 165 percent in March 1989. Hence, a 
self-fulfilling prophecy was realized when a 
major devaluation occurred. The nominative 
value of the austral declined 146 percent rela-
tive to its 1988 year-end level. (Bowne, p. 9) 
The Bonex and Convertibility Plans 
In July 1989 the Menem government took 
control of the Argentine nation. It inherited an 
economy racked by a hyperinflation so great 
that the CPI was rising by 196.6 percent per 
month. (Bowne, p. 9) External creditor rela-
tions were at a low point as the ability of 
Argentina to pay its debts remained question-
able. In fact, interest payments on commercial 
bank debts had gone into arrears in April1988, 
and payments to the World Bank were often 
late. As a result, the IMF and the World Bank 
programs designed to help alleviate the 
Argentine inflation problem had failed. 
The key objective of the new government 
was to stabilize prices and hence reduce the 
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hyperinflation. Therefore, the government 
devalued the austral , implemented a fixed 
exchange rate relative to the dollar, instituted 
wage and price controls, and sharply increased 
public utility rates in order to slow any future 
price jumps. These policies were fairly suc-
cessful with the monthly inflation rate soon 
reduced to 7.2 percent near the end of 1989. 
However, as had been the case in the past 
with previous stabilization efforts, expectations 
of a return of hyperinflation caused a sharp 
decline in the price of the foreign exchange 
markets . As gaps in prices occurred, investor 
anticipation that these reforms would be unsuc-
cessful caused many to reduce their holdings 
in the Argentine currency, thus causing the 
decline in exchange markets. As a conse-
quence, the government decided to take a dif-
ferent approach. The main focus now became 
reducing the public deficit, which had been the 
principal cause of the inflation. Thus , the 
Bonex Plan was implemented in December 
1989, which featured tax reforms and stricter 
control of public enterprises and of the lending 
activities of public sector banks. Previously, 
these banks had been financing local govern-
ment deficits through loans which were in turn 
financed with discounts from BCRA. Hence, 
public sector banks were financing loans 
through other discounted loans. The plan also 
eliminated all restrictions on foreign exchange 
transactions in order to allow for more freedom 
of movement of the currency. Lastly, the plan 
froze short-term bank deposits in which short-
term deposit holders (under thirty days) were 
only allowed to withdraw up to the equivalent 
of U.S. $1,000 from their accounts. The balance 
of their accounts was then made payable solely 
in Argentine government bonds. These bonds, 
called Bonex 89, were 10-year U.S. dollar 
denominated bonds. Investors were thus 
required to keep their short-term deposits in 
Argentine banks, creating greater stability in 
the financial community. 
Once again, though, the Argentine econ-
omy slipped into its old ways as the financing 
of government expenditures went undisciplined 
and unrestrained. As funds for the social secu-
rity system and provincial governments became 
depleted, the BCRA again expanded credit lines. 
It lent funds to the social security system and 
to provincial banks that were facing deposit 
runs. Events turned full circle as the provin-
cial banks ignored the dictates of the Bonex 
Plan and continued to lend for the purpose of 
financing provincial government deficits. Once 
again downward market pressure was exerted 
on the austral due to the credit expansion, and 
along with this pressure came a resurgence of 
price inflation. 
Therefore, in a pattern that was becoming 
all too common, still another stabilization pro-
gram was created in 1991 in an attempt to 
reduce the public sector deficit by raising pub-
lic utility rates and taxes. This latest effort is 
titled the Convertibility Plan, and it is based on 
two basic principles: 
1) There is to be full international 
reserve backing for the monetary 
base. The monetary base also may 
not exceed BCRA's gross interna-
tional assets at a fixed rate of one 
peso per U.S. dollar. In other 
words, the money supply can only 
be increased when backed by a 
similar increase in the level of 
international reserves. Thus, fis-
cal self-discipline is imposed by not 
allowing the government to 
increase the money supply when-
ever the public or financial sector 
needs to be financed. Further-
more, the peso is made fully con-
vertible to the U.S. dollar at a one-
to-one rate. 
2) The fiscal deficit is to be eliminated 
and a surplus in the primary cur-
rent accounts balance is to be 
achieved. In doing so, the govern-
ment will be able to service its debt 
and thus eliminate the need for 
further borrowing. 
The Convertibility Plan began in March 
1991 and has been in effect ever since. Its suc-
cess has won the support of the IMF, which 
designed a financial program for the Argentine 
public sector. Up through the first quarter of 
1994, Argentina has attained or surpassed the 
IMF primary balance targets. Overall, the plan 
has also been successful in reducing tax evasion 
and raising tax rates, in reducing public sector 
employment, in providing stricter discipline for 
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provincial banks, in strengthening the social 
security system's finances, and in rescheduling 
public sector debt. Since its implementation in 
March 1991, the inflation rate has dropped from 
27 percent per month to .4 percent per month 
in June 1994. For the year 1993, the annual 
inflation rate was only 7.4 percent. 
In order to achieve such successful results, 
three important structural changes in the gov-
ernment had to be implemented. First, the 
independence of the BCRA had to be established 
and enforced. No longer could it be used as a 
"tool" of the government to make money and 
to finance debt. Second, the deregulation of the 
economy had to occur. Economic restrictions 
such as import tariffs were lowered in order to 
encourage international trade. Other legisla-
tive restrictions were likewise removed in order 
to allow the private sector to provide several 
public services, including telephone, electrici-
ty, and natural gas. Markets were finally 
allowed to function freely, and competition was 
promoted. Third, privatizations of several state 
enterprises were put into effect. This last mea-
sure helped to reduce the government's out-
standing debt, to increase reserves , and to 
increase tax revenues from the new owners of 
the enterprises. It has also led to renewal of 
direct foreign investment in Argentina. Overall, 
the privatization program has raised about $9.7 
billion in cash proceeds for debt repayment and 
has reduced public sector debt principal by 
$13.4 billion through December 1993. 
The Brady Plan 
As of December 31 , 1993, non-financial 
public sector debt (federal government and pub-
lic utility debt, but not provincial debt) was 
$66.3 billion. A total of 92 percent of this net 
non-financial public sector debt was denomi-
nated in currencies other than the Argentine 
currency (mainly in U.S. dollars). (Bowne, p. 44) 
Earlier, in April 1992, Argentina had 
announced an agreement with the U.S. and the 
IMF to refinance this debt under the Brady Plan. 
In brief, the Brady Plan was to reduce the debt 
amount conditional upon the Argentine gov-
ernment's carrying out of structural economic 
reforms that met the approval of the IMF, such 
as removing government-imposed impediments 
to productivity and competitiveness and attract-
ing capital from abroad. Then, the existing debt 
would be converted into a form acceptable to 
the banks involved, while it would also reduce 
the overall debt burden. Basically, the Brady 
Plan called for governmental policies involving 
capitalism and competition to be fully imple-
mented in order to reduce the debt burden. 
The reduction of debt by the Brady Plan 
occurred through the use of par bonds, discount 
bonds, and floating-rate bonds. These bonds 
were exchanged for previously outstanding com-
mercial bank debt, including interest arrears. 
Overall, this plan reduced the face amount of 
debt denominated in foreign currency by near-
ly $3 billion and reduced by about 35 percent 
the net present value of the interest service. 
As a result of this reduction, the Argentine 
public debt as a percentage of GOP declined 
from 68.7 percent in 1989 to 25.9 percent in 
1993. (Bowne, p. 44) Just as importantly, peo-
ple's confidence returned to the system as 
Argentineans brought deposits from other 
banks back to Argentine banks. In fact, $35 bil-
lion in foreign assets were returned over this 
same period. Furthermore, investment 
increased significantly to about 19 percent of 
GOP by the end of 1993. 
Pursuant to this plan, Argentina has refi-
nanced over 96 percent of its commercial bank 
debt. An estimated $28.5 billion of debt, $9.2 
billion of which was interest arrears, was 
accepted by the IMF under the regulations of 
the plan. About 85 percent of those arrears to 
foreign banks was released in October 1993, and 
the remaining 15 percent was released in April 
1994. (Bowne, p. 44) 
Restoring Confidence 
As shown by the many previous plans that 
failed, greater discipline and stricter reforms in 
government policies are necessary in order for 
Argentina to avoid falling back into its former 
state of hyperinflation. Furthermore, success 
requires additional progress in three major 
areas if the necessary confidence is to be 
restored in the system. 
First, and most importantly, the govern-
ment must continue to display monetary and fis-
cal discipline. Memories of hyperinflation still 
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linger strongly in people's minds, and any hint 
of such a return would stimulate panic and col-
lapse of the economic system. Thus, it is of 
utmost importance that the money supply and 
the exchange rate are kept in check. Moreover, 
strict regulations over the daily actions and 
interactions of provincial banks must be insti-
tuted and enforced in order to keep the financial 
sector sound. In doing so, investor confidence 
will increase further and possible credit oppor-
tunities will then become more readily available. 
Second, state reforms must continue 
along the lines followed in recent years. For 
instance, competition and privatization projects 
must be encouraged. Argentina must join the 
rest of the world with an open and free market. 
However, as previously mentioned, these steps 
must be implemented gradually so as not to 
alarm investors or trigger yet another panic. 
Third, the government must continue to 
follow tight budgeting procedures. Until 
recently, the executive branch of the govern-
ment has not been required to submit a bud-
getary proposal to the legislative branch. The 
Convertibility Law now requires the govern-
ment to prescribe a budgetary proposal for 
expenditures. This budget is supposed to be 
closely maintained. Of course, due to the lack 
of experience with such procedures, this 
process is still in its early stages and improve-
ment in the financial budgeting methods is 
needed. But it is still important that such a pro-
cedure be continued and enforced in the future. 
These are the three most important polit-
ical and financial objectives that must be pur-
sued if Argentina is to recover fully from the 
debt crisis of 1982. Only if these objectives are 
met will the proposals to reducing the foreign-
denominated debt as assumed by the public sec-
tor finally succeed. 
The Future of the Argentine Debt 
Problem 
As we have seen, from the onset of the debt 
crisis in 1982, a number of proposals to resolve 
the Argentine debt problem have been intro-
duced. In each case, though, the proposals have 
revolved around two crucial questions: 1) who 
should bear the losses and 2) what reforms are 
required to reduce the chances of a similar sit-
uation arising in the future. 
Initially, the "solutions" required only the 
debtor country, Argentina, to sacrifice and make 
the necessary adjustments and reductions in 
general expenditures; but, these "solutions" 
seem to have ignored the responsibility of the 
lending institutions who are at least partly 
accountable for their own previous lending 
decisions to absorb some of the losses. Several 
of these proposals, which simply attempted to 
reschedule the debt payments, were basically 
ineffective since they just postponed and 
increased the arrears of the already extraordi-
nary debt level. 
For example, although the Brady Plan 
appeared to solve a portion of the Argentine 
problem through a reduction in the face value 
of the debt, the basic premise has once again 
been to refinance the debt through new debt. 
In sum, the attempt was to create a market-ori-
ented system for Argentina in order to help it 
eventually repay the debt. However, the plan 
may in fact just be delaying the need for anoth-
er Brady Plan to be put in place at the maturi-
ty of the newly issued bonds. 
The reason why finding a solution is so dif-
ficult results from the age-old Argentine prob-
lem of a lack of exports. The only way out of 
the problem in the long run is to increase the 
volume of exports. Export expansion can be 
achieved only if the Argentine economy grows, 
a condition which of course requires capital. 
From where can this capital come? At the 
most obvious level, lending institutions need to 
provide some of this capital, as is the case with 
the Brady Plan. However, Argentina cannot 
remain entirely dependent on foreign bank 
loans and bond issues. As noted above, it must 
attempt to create a trade surplus so that its 
exports can help finance the repayment of inter-
est. More importantly, the private sector needs 
to provide some of the capital. Only if this 
domestic market for generating capital devel-
ops will long-term success be achieved, and 
only then will large-scale foreign investment 
return to Argentina. 
The only long-term solution then is to 
ensure that the returning foreign investment 
is devoted to projects that generate more pro-
duction and benefits than their investment cost. 
Those funds must be put to good use in order 
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for Argentina to raise itself up to the standards 
of production and living of other developed 
nations. Greater success with its investments 
will occur only through 1) the implementation 
of free-market-oriented policies including the 
encouragement of competition and privatiza-
tion, 2) the reduction of barriers, by developed 
countries, to Argentine exports, and 3) more 
robust domestic economic policies. These poli-
cies must also center around investment in the 
Argentine people. Furthermore, Argentina has 
to improve the climate for enterprise. For 
example, the government must reduce inter-
vention in industrial and agricultural pricing 
and focus more on improving infrastructure 
and institutions. Finally, firm macroeconomic 
policies must be followed. As already stated, 
inflation must be held in check and fiscal 
deficits kept low. Incentives for savings and 
investment must be set in place. It has been 
well-established in the financial world that high 
domestic savings and investment rates are nec-
essary for a country to reach a more economi-
cally developed stage. 
The end result of these policy improve-
ments will be both economic growth and finan-
cial growth. If such developments occur, in 
addition to the necessary political reforms men-
tioned earlier, then a "solution" can be both 
reached and maintained. 
The Involvement of Other Nations 
As previously stated, the Argentine debt 
crisis is a two-sided problem. Both the bor-
rower and the lenders are partly to blame. The 
lesson to be learned by both parties is that an 
optima/level and composition of debt does 
exist, and that the amount of debt undertaken 
was far too great. The key, however, is for all 
countries involved to more carefully search for 
this optimal level, to take precautions to reduce 
the chances of such a crisis from occurring 
again, and to continue to search for methods to 
reduce the debt problem. 
Borrowing and lending nations must real-
ize that country financing should be done with 
more equity and less debt. Of course, such 
measures will transfer more control from the 
borrowing country to the investor. However, 
this transfer will then increase the country's 
capacity to carry debt by improving its produc-
tivity through wise investments. This increase 
in private sector productivity will in turn raise 
overall output and hence the debt capacity of 
the country as a whole. Furthermore, because 
equity investors will be sharing a portion of the 
risk, they will search more thoroughly for good 
investments. Foreign investors must also be 
able to generate sufficient foreign exchange to 
pay their own way, which will increase the 
country's capacity to service foreign financing. 
Among the possible measures to increase 
equity and reduce debt in country financing are 
debt-for-equity swaps and privatization. In a 
debt-for-equity swap, a portion of the debt is 
traded or sold for equity in domestic compa-
nies. This instrument requires a government 
appreciation of and initiative toward increased 
foreign investment and a more open economy. 
However, no major government intervention 
should be necessary since an open economy 
should attract the foreign investment anyway, 
providing the country with the foreign 
exchange necessary to buy back the debt in the 
secondary market. The important step, again, 
is the opening of the economy in order to allow 
for the other benefits to follow. 
In addition, debt-for-equity swaps could be 
combined with the already successful privati-
zation program. The debt could be exchanged 
for ownership shares in state enterprises, as 
happened in 1992 with the sale of the Argentine 
telephone company, ENTEL. The government 
split the company into two parts, selling 60 per-
cent of each part through debt-for-equity swaps. 
Several foreign and domestic banks and tele-
phone companies were involved in the swaps. 
Other U.S. banks contributed some of the debt 
from their own balance sheets, thus easing the 
burden. However, the bulk of the debt was 
acquired on the secondary market where the 
defaulted Argentine debt was trading for as low 
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as 14 cents on the dollar. Overall, the Argentine 
foreign debt was reduced by $5 billion, and 
interest costs were cut by nearly $500 million 
per year. 
Conclusion 
The Argentine debt crisis is not over, and 
perhaps it can never be solved. It has evolved 
from decades of structural insolvency, backward 
financial repression, and unwise political and 
economic policies. Its history is long and bit-
ter, while improvements are only recent and 
possibly short-lived. 
However, Argentina is a country full of 
potential. Perhaps these past few successful 
years are a signal of what the future holds. In 
order to progress further, though, Argentina 
must pursue economic policies that instill con-
fidence in the minds of its people. Monetary 
and fiscal discipline must be maintained, espe-
cially during government transitions. The 
economy must grow through the stimulation 
of investment. In other words, the domestic 
market must develop further in order to 
advance the privatization program and achieve 
a growth in exports. 
Of course, such reforms will not occur -
nor will the debt crisis end - overnight. But 
if Argentina can continue along its recent path 
of improvement and if the United States and the 
other countries of the world make every 
attempt to aid in Argentina's development, then 
at least the worst aspects of the debt crisis can 
be alleviated. No matter how gradual the 
process may appear, a solution is attainable. Its 
success, though, can only be assessed through 
the passing of time. In the words of Argentina's 
Undersecretary to the Minister of Economics, 
Dario Braun, "We're renting stability, and each 
month we have to pay the rent." (Braun) 
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